Information influence targeting European elections in 2025
In general, the risk of a country being subjected to malign information influence increases in an election year. In 2025, the Psychological Defence Agency monitored a number of elections in Europe in order to analyse and assess threat actors’ use of information influence in connection with elections. Countries in Russia’s regional vicinity have been particularly vulnerable.
Malign information influence is continuously directed at Sweden and other Western countries. In the past year, several countries in Europe that have held elections have been subjected to election interference, mainly from Russia, which works systematically and with extensive resources.
Countries in Russia’s immediate regional vicinity have been particularly vulnerable. Election interference in these countries has included a broad spectrum of hybrid activities, combining malign information influence with attacks both in the cyber domain and in the physical environment, for example through sabotage.
While election interference can target all voters, sometimes specific groups in society, political candidates or parties are subjected. AI and other new technologies have made it considerably easier to target and tailor information at pinpointed groups, and the technology is being developed at breakneck speed.
Russia has primarily used election interference to sway political preferences and to undermine the electoral process. A recurring objective has been to create division, weaken support for Ukraine, and undermine support for Western institutions, the EU and NATO. This has been done by disseminating posts containing rumours of electoral fraud, by attempting to create unease and fear of attacks at polling stations, and by smearing candidates. Social media has primarily been used to this end, with fake news sites, experts and organisations, and AI has enabled creating, targeting and tailoring information to specific groups.
Moldova’s 2025 election
Parliamentary elections were held in Moldova on 28 September 2025. Even before the election, the responsible Moldovan authorities considered that Russia would likely attempt to employ improper methods to influence both the electoral process and public opinion ahead of the election.
In connection with the election, Russia employed a broad spectrum of hybrid activities, combining malign information influence with attacks both in the cyber domain and in the physical environment, for example through vote buying and sabotage.
Russian information influence was largely perpetrated by well-known Russian influence networks, as well as extensive pro-Russian website and Telegram networks. A particularly common tactic ahead of the parliamentary election was the dissemination of “leaks” in the form of forged documents, voice recordings or deepfakes on social media, aimed at discrediting parties and candidates, and also at undermining confidence in the electoral process.
The 2025 Norwegian election
In September 2025, elections were held in Norway. Although there were attempts at election interference, it is not considered that they had any impact.
In connection with the Norwegian election, Russia directed malign information influence at Norway, one aim being to attempt to weaken support for Ukraine. By spreading disinformation and amplifying divisive messages concerning both domestic and foreign policy, Russia attempted to engage in influence.
Cyber-attacks also occured. In connection with the election, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks were perpetrated, and the website of the Conservative Party (Høyre) was subjected to a cyber-attack that the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) has assessed to be linked to a pro-Russian hacker group.
The 2024 European Parliament election
In an attempt to weaken support for Ukraine, sway the political agenda and outcome of selected countries’ elections to the European Parliament in June 2024, it has emerged that Russian communications firm Social Design Agency (SDA), with links to the Kremlin, has long attempted to sway public opinion in several European countries.
Leaked documents show that the SDA had spread false and misleading information through fake websites, botnets, memes and manipulated comments fields on social media. The examination also reveals the sheer scale of the campaign – in the first months of 2024 alone, the SDA generated around 34 million comments and published nearly 40,000 videos, memes and other graphic posts. The company had worked based on clear strategies and selected sensitive social issues in different countries to maximise dissemination and influence.