The Psychological Defence Agency’s situational assessment ahead of the election

Sweden and Swedish elections are not currently a priority target for Russian information influence. At the same time, the 2026 elections in Sweden are being held against a backdrop of serious security concerns, reflected in a high degree of uncertainty, which could increase the risk of election interference.

Malign information influence is continuously directed at Sweden and other Western countries. At the same time, the extent of information influence targeting Sweden and Swedish interests directly in the past year has been significantly lower than in 2022 and 2023, when Sweden was subjected to two major influence campaigns. The primary threat actor in terms of malign information influence directed at Sweden is Russia, and the Psychological Defence Agency considers that Russia is also the main threat associated with the Swedish elections. However, Swedish elections are not currently a priority target for Russian information influence, although Sweden could become subjected and the situation could change rapidly.

Russia is primarily attempting to influence support for Ukraine. In Sweden, there is broad consensus on support for Ukraine, which in itself reduces the incentives for Russia to attempt to influence Sweden in connection with the election, although they may continue to seek new angles for influence and adapt messages to specific target groups.

AI lowers thresholds for malign information influence

In connection with other elections in Europe, heightened use of generative AI to interfere in elections – in the form of videos, images and voice recordings, for example – has been observed. It has become considerably easier to target and tailor information to specific groups, and the technical threshold for engaging in information influence has been lowered in recent years.

Today’s generative AI enables individual users to rapidly produce material that is not only overwhelming in volume, but also credible. This is also the case for threat actors, which can generate and edit antagonistic images and videos that can be spread organically and gain extensive reach without either coordinated networks or amplification by botnets.

A recurring pattern, observed both in Sweden and in other countries, is that a single threat actor promotes contradictory messages in order to create division and inflame tensions. For example, through botnets, accounts act in a polarising manner, with some parts of the network expressing support for an issue while others are critical and question it.

Based on this, all parts of society need to stand prepared for the prospect of foreign actors potentially attempting to engage in malign information influence ahead of the Swedish elections, for example by using botnets or AI-generated content on social media, in an attempt to give the impression that public opinion is stronger on a certain issue than it actually is.

Collaboration essential in strengthening resilience

Collaboration with other actors working with the election is paramount in counteracting malign information influence. The Psychological Defence Agency is part of the national elections network and is already engaged in both capability-enhancing activities aimed at other actors in society and collaboration with others to bolster resilience.

The Psychological Defence Agency continuously monitors foreign threat actors’ information activities directed at Sweden and assesses their capabilities and intentions for attempting to influence the Swedish election. Together with others, the agency also conducts training and exercises to strengthen the capabilities of important actors in the Swedish system, and communicates to raise awareness and bolster knowledge and resilience.

Protecting Swedish democratic elections from malign information influence is a core task of psychological defence in general and of the Psychological Defence Agency in particular.