Local training course created in Karlstad

The municipality of Karlstad has taken the step to implement the Capability Platform in a concrete context in the form of its own training initiative. With the support of the municipal executive management and a clear remit within psychological defence, the municipality is working to implement the tools of the Capability Platform in its work locally. Director of Communications Katarina Äleklint talks about the background and lessons learned.

In the series Encounters with information influence, the Psychological Defence Agency showcases stories from public-sector actors that have encountered disinformation, propaganda or other misleading information in their work. The aim is to share concrete experiences, highlight common challenges and help to strengthen Sweden’s psychological defence.

It is important to note that some of the examples raised do not necessarily involve foreign powers, but may also concern other types of information influence that affect essential services.

You’ve created your own training course based on the Capability Platform. How come?

It’s about the new times we’re living in. Society has changed, and the need to bolster civil defence has climbed up municipalities’ agenda. For us, it was natural to create a training course on this theme, linked to the new conditions. We’ve previously worked extensively with internal training in Karlstad and have trained both officials and elected representatives in issues related to democracy, communication and influence.

Karlstad municipality has long worked with issues concerning trust and democracy. Can you tell us more about this work?

For many years, we’ve been working to increase trust and strengthen democracy. A clear example is from 2015, when Sweden received a great number of refugees. Even before terms such as ‘unlawful influence’ came into broad use, we in Karlstad initiated the campaign “Openness – yes please”.

The campaign was about extending a warm welcome to the new arrivals. We sent out the message to all households, with a call to welcome the new arrivals. We also created a system in which residents could register to be contact persons online.

In connection with this, we were subjected to an extensive and coordinated influence campaign. It was the first time we realised how information influence can strike a municipality, and how powerless you can be in the face of it. Communications flooded in from all over Sweden and the Nordic countries, often with the exact same wording full of hatred and threats. We understood that it was an organised, practised narrative.

How has it affected your work approach today?

Today we have better tools. But, an important lesson that we have learned over time – especially in light of the impact of social media, widened polarisation and a tougher discourse climate – is that, as a municipality, we need to think differently about how we communicate. We can’t be seen as propagandists – especially on issues that may affect polarisation, where we need to consider matters carefully and take responsibility for how we deliver messages.

Information influence need not always come from antagonistic foreign powers. It could just as well come from organised crime, dogmatic individuals or strong opinion leaders with a harsh tone. Such attempts at influence can instil fear in the organisation, which can lead in turn to decisions being shelved or abandoned altogether – an aspect which, in the long run, risks impeding both the performance of official duties and the entire democratic process.

How have you tried to manage this?

Like I said before, we’ve worked a great deal with internal training. For example, we have a training course called “Managing a harsh discourse climate and unlawful influence”. It’s designed for both officials and elected representatives in the municipality, and over 3,500 people have undergone the training.

This is unlawful influence

Unlawful influence is a collective term for actions aimed at swaying an official or elected representative into acting in a way contrary to their intention – for example, making a different decision as part of their exercise of public authority, or choosing not to report a matter to the police.

Unlawful influence can involve criminal acts but also acts that are not crimes in the legal sense. An incident is classified as unlawful influence if the victim perceives that the purpose was to influence their performance of official duties.

Source: The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR), Unlawful influence External link.

We’ve also developed “Democratic discourse” – a training course designed for the citizens of Karlstad. The course includes various components that address aspects such as source criticism, critical thinking and how we can safeguard democracy together by contributing to an open and respectful discourse climate.

How have you used the Capability Platformin your work?

The content of the Capability Platformis excellent, and the Psychological Defence Agency has done a great job with it, but the municipalities need to simplify the material and adapt the information to a local context. They need to be able to talk to residents and employees in a way adapted to them, making the content more available for concrete use here and now. Not everyone needs all the knowledge contained in the Capability Platform. You could say that we’ve translated the Capability Platforminto a Karlstad context – so that the content works in our organisation and for our target groups.

The training course was completed in May and has already been tested internally. This autumn we’ll be rolling out the training course to the various administrative units, starting with the municipal management, administrative directors, managing directors of municipal companies, and then management groups in administrative units and companies. Employees who will be working on the election next year will also be trained. We’ll also have a particular focus on the communicators, who are often the first to discover what is being written on social media.

How well-anchored is your work on psychological defence in the municipality?

This work is anchored at both the political and organisational level. The municipal council has set goals to strengthen democracy and increase trust in society, and the entire municipal group has been commissioned with working on this. Besides, we’ve been given a specific assignment by the municipal executive board to help build up civil defence, linked to what is happening at the national level right now.

We’ve also organised ourselves based on how the agencies with sectoral responsibility are structured, and translated this locally for our organisation. In the municipality we’ve also appointed responsible individuals for each area.

The communication function has been assigned responsibility for coordinating and developing the municipality’s work with psychological defence. This includes external monitoring, but also developing the municipality’s work on unlawful information influence and disinformation, as well as strengthening self-preparedness and willingness to defend – among both municipal employees and residents. An important part of our field is also to develop how we work with strategic communication in this area.

Were you subjected to the influence campaign against the social services in 2022?

We were probably relatively spared compared with other municipalities, but we’re still monitoring the issue. Fear and distrust of the municipality as an authority are also present in Karlstad, albeit not to the same extent. To create good relations with residents, the social services have sound cooperation in place with the police and schools.

I think we have a lot to learn from the campaign against the social services in 2022 – especially in terms of how we manage and convey information. There’s a lag in the contingency system, whereby information from the authorities with sectoral responsibility must first go through the county administrative boards before reaching the municipalities. Our experience is that the information often comes too late – for example, a message platform or other communication support might be provided by the Psychological Defence Agency or the Civil Contingencies Agency, but the county administrative board doesn’t send it out until the need has already become urgent.

Part of the problem is that the authorities with sectoral responsibility lack direct points of entry into the municipalities. Yet, it’s in the municipalities that incidents have actually occurred – we’re the ones who are closest to inhabitants, and who have relations with them and channels for reaching them. There would be a lot to gain from finding a solution to make the information flow faster and smoother.

Do you have any final advice for other municipalities with similar thoughts with regard to the Capability Platform?

Be bold – make your own Capability Platform! The materials are great, but for them to actually work in daily operations, they need to be adapted for a local context. Think about how you can make them relevant, concrete and available – so that they encourage engagement and lead to actual change.

Other elements of the Capability Platform

Detect and counter the threat

Act effectively when malign information influence is taking place. Detect, analyse and manage the situation through coordination and strategic communication.

Reinforce the organisation

Make use of the knowledge that the organisation has gathered, and develop it. Hold training and exercises to reinforce the organisation.